To: Pete Mandik

From: Matthew Messina

Sent: Monday, October 09, 2000 12:25 PM

Subject: Brain's in Vats

I possess a great deal of respect for Hilary Putnam and the mind/language problem he contemplates in the first chapter of his book. He states that he "thought of the issue for a long time and consulted others" before he was convinced it was correct. It is, however, my truly humble opinion that Dr. Putnam is incorrect in his postulation that one can not be a brain in a vat, if that is actually what he is attempting to declare. Because of the great deal of intelligent thought Dr. Putnam has put into his writing, I felt it would take a very complex argument to refute him, one of the finest philosophers and mathematicians. But I submit to you that I can make my case in a fairly simple manner.

My position, once again, is that one, whether you, me or another person, can make the claim "I am a brain in a vat" while still being a brain in a vat. Whether the vat to which I make reference is the same vat or not is interesting, but irrelevant when discussing the possibility of existence as a brain in vat. I shall, then, disprove the notion that one can not be a brain in a vat with a simple dialogue involving Hilary Putnam, the brain of Homer Simpson in a vat (for comedic levity) and you, Pete Mandik (for comedic levity - no, not really, only joking.)

Hilary: Behold young Pete, a brain in a vat.

Pete: My liege, however does one acquire a human brain for such an experiment?

Hilary: Simply by offering a subject a six-pack and a bag of potato chips.

Pete: Is this not unethical and, perhaps more importantly, completely illegal.

Hilary: Yes, yes. Of course it is, so be quiet or Harvard will have my ass.

Brain in Vat: I want a peanut. Also, I am a brain in a vat.

Hilary: Ha, ha. That fool. It is impossible for that brain in vat to be a 'brain in a vat.' When will these brains in vats learn?

Pete: Yes, master. Wait one moment... Perhaps that dashing English major in my Philosophy of Mind class was right. Maybe, just maybe, that brain in a vat is a 'brain in the vat.'

(note I, being an English major, could have made this much longer and filled with symbolism and meaningful examples to support my overall core-idea if I so chose, like Plato, Shakespeare or Melville.)

All that I really think Dr. Putnam accomplished was to show the problematic nature of language, written or spoken. All that Dr. Putnam's postulation amounts to is a feat of semantic athleticism. His claim that the brain's concept of 'vat' is not the same as an 'actual-world-vat' is true, but it is also meaningless if the brain is really located in a vat, because then it could not be explained away with semantically, which I hope I was successfully able to accomplish with my dialogue.

To recapitulate my argument, it would seem logical that a brain in the vat would still be a 'brain in a vat' even though it stated that it is a brain in vat. Therefore, in a Cartesian reduction-process, one could say that it is impossible for a brain in a vat to refer to the actual-world vat in which it is located without having seen the vat. The brain's concept of vat would not be the same as an actual-world vat. I have shown, I strongly feel, that such a brain in such an actual-world vat can make such a claim as being a 'brain in a vat' while still actually being a 'brain in a vat;' though the brain's statement is semantically incorrect, it is, nevertheless, 'a brain in a vat.'